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Abstract
Recently there have been some unexpected results concerning Fuzzy Description
Logics (FDLs) with General Concept Inclusions (GCIs). They show that, unlike the
classical case, the DL ALC with GCIs does not have the finite model property under
 Lukasiewicz Logic or Product Logic and, specifically, knowledge base satisfiability is
an undecidable problem for Product Logic. We complete here the analysis by showing
that knowledge base satisfiability is also an undecidable problem for  Lukasiewicz Logic.
1 Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) [1] play a key role in the design of Ontologies. Indeed, DLs are
important as they are essentially the theoretical counterpart of theWeb Ontology Language
OWL 2 [19], the standard language to represent ontologies.
It is very natural to extend DLs to the fuzzy case and several fuzzy extensions of DLs
can be found in the literature. For a recent survey on the advances in the field of fuzzy
DLs, we refer the reader to [18]. Besides the enrichment of DLs with fuzzy features, one of
the challenges of the research in this community is the fact that different families of fuzzy
operators (or fuzzy logics) lead to fuzzy DLs with different computational properties.
Decidability of fuzzy DLs is often shown by adapting crisp DL tableau-based algorithms
to the fuzzy DL case [8, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26], or a reduction to classical DLs [5, 6, 7, 9, 24],
or relying on some Mathematical Fuzzy Logic [13] based procedures [11, 12, 14, 15].
However, recently there have been some unexpected surprises [2, 3, 4]. Indeed, unlike
the classical case, for the DL ALC with GCIs (i) [4] shows that it does not have the
finite model property under  Lukasiewicz Logic or Product Logic, illustrates that some
algorithms are neither complete not correct, and shows some interesting conditions under
which decidability is still guaranteed; and (ii) [2, 3] show that knowledge base satisfiability
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is an undecidable problem for it under Product Logic. Also worth mentioning is [10], which
illustrates the undecidability of knowledge base satisfiability if one replaces the truth set
[0, 1] with complete De Morgan lattices equipped with a t-norm operator.
In this paper, we complete the analysis by showing that knowledge base satisfiability is
an undecidable problem for the DL ALC with GCIs under [0, 1]-valued  Lukasiewicz Logic
as well. We prove our result following conceptually the methods devised in [2, 3, 10].
We next introduce briefly our fuzzy DL, then we illustrate the undecidability result.
2 The FDL  L-ALC
In this section we are going to introduce the general definitions of  L-ALC based on
 Lukasiewicz t-norm.
Syntax. Let A be a set of concept names, R be a set of role names. Concept names
denote unary predicates, while role names denote binary predicates. The set of  L-ALC
concepts are built from concept names A (also called atomic concepts) using connectives
and quantification constructs over roles R 1 as described by the following syntactic rules:
C → ⊤ | ⊥ | A | C1 ⊓C2 | C1 ⊔C2 | ¬C | ∃R.C | ∀R.C .
An assertion axiom is an expression of the form 〈a:C,n〉 (concept assertion, a is an instance
of concept C to degree at least n) or of the form 〈(a1, 12):R,n〉 (role assertion, (a1, a2) is
an instance of role R to degree at least n), where a, a1, a2 are individual names, C is a
concept, R is a role name and n ∈ (0, 1] is a rational (a truth value). An ABox A consists
of a finite set of assertion axioms.
A General Concept Inclusion (GCI) axiom is of the form 〈C1 ⊑ C2, n〉 (C1 is a sub-
concept of C2 to degree at least n), where Ci is a concept and n ∈ (0, 1] is a rational. A
concept hierarchy T , also called TBox, is a finite set of GCIs. In what follows we will use
the following shorthands:
• C1 ⊑ C2 for 〈C1 ⊑ C2, 1〉 and a:C for 〈a:C, 1〉;
• C1 ≡ C2 for the two axioms C1 ⊑ C2 and C2 ⊑ C1;
• C1 → C2 for ¬C1 ⊔ C2;
• C1 ↔ C2 for (C1 → C2) ⊓ (C2 → C1);
• min{C1, C2} for C1⊓ (C1 → C2), and min{C1, . . . , Cn} for min{. . .min{C1, C2}, . . .};
• max{C1, C2} for (C1 → C2)→ C2 and max{C1, . . . , Cn} for max{. . .max{C1, C2}, . . .};
1Each symbol may have super- and/or subscripts.
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⊥I(x) = 0
⊤I(x) = 1
(C ⊓D)I(x) = CI(x)⊗DI(x)
(C ⊔D)I(x) = CI(x)⊕DI(x)
(¬C)I(x) = ⊖CI(x)
(∀R.C)I(x) = infy∈∆I{R
I(x, y)⇒ CI(y)}
(∃R.C)I(x) = supy∈∆I{R
I(x, y)⊗ CI(y)}
Table 1: Semantics for  L-ALC.
• n · C for the n-ary disjunction C ⊔ . . . ⊔C;
Finally, a knowledge base K = 〈T ,A〉 consists of a TBox T and an ABox A.
Semantics. From a semantics point of view, an axiom 〈α, n〉 constrains the truth de-
gree of the expression α to be at least n. In the following, we use ⊗,⊕,⊖ and ⇒ to
denote  Lukasiewicz t-norm, t-conorm, negation function, and implication function, respec-
tively [17]. They are defined as operations in [0, 1] by means of the following functions:
a⊗ b = max{0, a+ b− 1}
a⊕ b = min{1, a+ b}
⊖a = 1− a
a⇒ b = min{1, 1 − a+ b} ,
where a and b are arbitrary elements in [0, 1]. As in the classical framework, the implication
can be defined in terms of disjunction (whose semantics is the t-conorm) and negation in the
usual way: a⇒ b = ⊖a⊕ b. Note also that for any implication defined from a continuous
t-norm ⊗, it holds that: x⇒ y = max{z | x⊗ z ≤ y}, which is equivalent to the condition:
y ≥ x⊗ z iff (x⇒ y) ≥ z.
A fuzzy interpretation (or model) is a pair I = (∆I , ·I) consisting of a nonempty (crisp)
set ∆I (the domain) and of a fuzzy interpretation function ·I that assigns:
1. to each atomic concept A a function AI : ∆I → [0, 1],
2. to each role R a function RI : ∆I ×∆I → [0, 1],
3. to each individual a an element aI ∈ ∆I such that aI 6= bI if a 6= b (Unique Name
Assumption, different individuals denote different objects of the domain).
The fuzzy interpretation function is extended to complex concepts as specified in Table 1
(where x, y ∈ ∆I are elements of the domain). Hence, for every complex concept C we get
a function CI : ∆I → [0, 1]. The satisfiability of axioms is then defined by the following
conditions:
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1. I satisfies an axiom 〈a:C,α〉 if CI(aI) ≥ α,
2. I satisfies an axiom 〈(a, b):R,α〉 if RI(aI , bI) ≥ α,
3. I satisfies an axiom 〈C ⊑ D,α〉 if (C ⊑ D)I ≥ α where
(C ⊑ D)I = inf
x∈∆I
{CI(x)⇒ DI(x)} .
It is interesting to point out that the satisfaction of a GCI of the form 〈C ⊑ D, 1〉 is exactly
the requirement that ∀x ∈ ∆I , CI(x) ≤ DI(x) (i.e., Zadeh’s set inclusion); hence, in this
particular case for the satisfaction it only matters the partial order and not the exact value
of the implication ⇒.
As it is expected we will say that a fuzzy interpretation I satisfies a KB K in case that
it satisfies all axioms in K. And it is said that a fuzzy KB K is satisfiable iff there exist a
fuzzy interpretation I satisfying every axiom in K.
In this paper, we mainly focus on witnessed models. This notion (see [14]) corresponds
to the restriction to the DL language of the notion of witnessed model introduced, in the
context of the first-order language, by Ha´jek in [16]. Specifically, a fuzzy interpretation I
is said to be witnessed iff it holds that for every complex concepts C,D, every role R, and
every x ∈ ∆I there is some
1. y ∈ ∆I such that (∃R.C)I(x) = RI(x, y)⊗ CI(y)
2. y ∈ ∆I such that (∀R.C)I(x) = RI(x, y)⇒ CI(y)
If I satisfies only condition 1. then I is said to be weakly witnessed. Note that for
 Lukasiewicz logic, condition 1. and 2. are equivalent, so I is weakly witnessed iff I is
witnessed. Thorough the paper we will rely on the notion of witnessed interpretation only,
but keep in mind that the results apply, thus, to weakly witnessed interpretations as well.
Note also that it is obvious that all finite fuzzy interpretations (this means that ∆I is a
finite set) are indeed strongly witnessed but the opposite is not true.
Sometimes (see, e.g., [3]), the notion of witnessed interpretatations is strengthened to
so-called strongly witnessed interpretations by imposing that additionally that for every
complex concepts C,D and every x ∈ ∆I there is some
• y ∈ ∆I such that (C ⊑ D)I = CI(y)⇒ DI(y)
has to hold. We do not deal with strongly witnessed interpretations here.
A fuzzy KB K is said to be satisfiable iff there exist a fuzzy interpretation I satisfying
every axiom in K.
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3 Undecidability of  L-ALC with GCIs
Our proof consists in a reduction of the reverse of the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP)
and follows conceptually the one in [2, 3, 10]. PCP is well-known to be undecidable [20],
so is the reverse PCP, as shown next.
Definition 1 (PCP). Let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp be two finite lists of words over an
alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. The Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) asks whether there is
a non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik .
Such a sequence, if it exists, is called a solution of the problem instance.
For the sake of our purpose, we will rely on a variant of the PCP, which we call Reverse
PCP (RPCP). Essentially, words are concatenated from right to left rather than from left
to right.
Definition 2 (RPCP). Let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp be two finite lists of words over an
alphabet Σ = {1, . . . , s}. The Reverse Post Correspondence Problem (RPCP) asks whether
there is a non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that vikvik−1 . . . vi1 =
wikwik−1 . . . wi1. Such a sequence, if it exists, is called a solution of the problem instance.
For a word µ = i1i2 . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . , p}
∗ we will use vµ, wµ to denote the words
vikvik−1 . . . vi1 and wikwik−1 . . . wi1 . We denote the empty string as ǫ and define vǫ is ǫ.
The alphabet Σ consists of the first s positive integers. We can thus view every word in Σ∗
as a natural number represented in base s+1 in which 0 never occurs. Using this intuition,
we will use the number 0 to encode the empty word.
Now we show that the reduction from PCP to RPCP is a very simple matter and it can
be done through the transformation of the instance lists to the lists of their palindromes
defined as follows: let Σ = {1, . . . , s} be an alphabet and v = t1t2 . . . t|v| a word over Σ,
with ti ∈ Σ, for 1 ≤ j ≤ |v|, then the palindrome of v is defined as pal(v) = t|v|t|v|−1 . . . t1.
Lemma 3. Let v1, . . . , vp and w1, . . . , wp be two finite lists of words over an alphabet
Σ = {1, . . . , s}. For every non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p it holds that
vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik
iff
pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) = pal(wik)pal(wik−1) . . . pal(wi1) .
(Proof) First we prove by induction on k, that, for every sequence v = vi1vi2 . . . vik of
words over Σ, it holds that pal(v) = pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1).
• The case k = 1 is straightforward.
• Let v = vi1vi2 . . . vik and suppose, by inductive hypothesis, that pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik−1)
= pal(vik−1)pal(vik−2) . . . pal(vi1). It follows that pal(v) = pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik−1 , vik) =
pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1).
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Since the palindrome of a word is unique, we have that, if vi1vi2 . . . vik = wi1wi2 . . . wik ,
then pal(vi1vi2 . . . vik) = pal(wi1wi2 . . . wik) and, thus, pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) =
pal(wik)pal(wik−1) . . . pal(wi1).
Corollary 4. The RPCP is undecidable.
(Proof) The proof is based on the reduction of PCPs to RCPs. For every instance ϕ =
(v1, w1), . . . , (vp, wp) of PCP, let f be the function
f(ϕ) = (pal(v1), pal(w1)), . . . , (pal(vp), pal(wp)) .
Clearly f is a computable function. Moreover, ϕ ∈ PCP if and only if there ex-
ists a non-empty sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik, with 1 ≤ ij ≤ p such that vi1vi2 . . . vik =
wi1wi2 . . . wik , that is, by Lemma 3,
pal(vik)pal(vik−1) . . . pal(vi1) = pal(wik)pal(wik−1) . . . pal(wi1)
i.e., f(ϕ) ∈ RPCP . Therefore, ϕ ∈ PCP if and only if f(ϕ) ∈ RPCP .
Undecidability of general KB satisfiability. We show the undecidability by a reduc-
tion of RPCPs to KB satisfiability problems. Specifically, given an instance ϕ of RPCP,
we will construct a Knowledge Base Oϕ that is satisfiable iff ϕ has no solution.
In order to do this we will encode words v from the alphabet Σ as rational numbers 0.v
in [0, 1] in base s+ 1; the empty word will be encoded by the number 0.
So, let us define the TBox
T := { V ≡ V1 ⊔ V2,W ≡W1 ⊔W2 }
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ p the TBoxes
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T iϕ := { ⊤ ⊑ ∃Ri.⊤,
V ⊑ (s+ 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1,
(s+ 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 ⊑ V,
W ⊑ (s+ 1)|wi| · ∀Ri.W1,
(s+ 1)|wi| · ∃Ri.W1 ⊑W
〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.V2, 0.vi〉,
〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.¬V2, 1− 0.vi〉,
〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.W2, 0.wi〉,
〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.¬W2, 1− 0.wi〉,
A ⊑ (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∀Ri.A
(s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∃Ri.A ⊑ A } .
Now, let
Tϕ = T ∪
p⋃
i=1
T iϕ .
Further we define the ABox A as follows:
A := {a : ¬V, a : ¬W, 〈a : A, 0.01〉, 〈a : ¬A, 0.99〉} .
Finally, we define
Oϕ := 〈Tϕ,A〉 .
We now define the interpretation
Iϕ := (∆
Iϕ , ·Iϕ)
as follows:
• ∆Iϕ = {1, . . . , p}∗
• aIϕ = ǫ
• V Iϕ(ǫ) = W Iϕ(ǫ) = 0, AIϕ(ǫ) = 0.01, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, V
Iϕ
i (ǫ) = W
Iϕ
i (ǫ) = 0
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• for all µ, µ′ ∈ ∆Iϕ and 1 ≤ i ≤ p
R
Iϕ
i (µ, µ
′) =
{
1, if µ′ = µi
0, otherwise
• for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ , where µ = i1i2 . . . ik 6= ǫ
– V Iϕ(µ) = 0.vµ, W
Iϕ(µ) = 0.wµ
– AIϕ(µ) = 0.01 · (s+ 1)
−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}
max{|vj |,|wj|}
– V
Iϕ
1 (µ) = 0.vµ¯ ·(s+1)
−|vik |, W
Iϕ
1 (µ) = 0.wµ¯ ·(s+1)
−|wik |, where µ¯ = i1i2 . . . ik−1
(last index ik is dropped from µ, and we assume that 0.ǫ is 0),
– V
Iϕ
2 (µ) = 0.vik , W
Iϕ
2 (µ) = 0.wik .
It is easy to see that Iϕ is a witnessed model of Oϕ (note that e.g., (∀Ri.V1)
Iϕ(µ) =
V
Iϕ
1 (µi).
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Moreover, as in [2] it is possible to prove that, for every witnessed model I of Oϕ, there
is a mapping g from Iϕ to I.
Lemma 5. Let I be a witnessed model of Oϕ. Then there exists a function g : ∆
Iϕ → ∆I
such that, for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ , CIϕ(µ) = CI(g(µ)) holds for every concept name C and
R
Iϕ
i (µ, µi) = R
I
i (g(µ), g(µi)) holds for every i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
(Proof) Let I be a witnessed model of Oϕ. We will build the function g inductively on
the length of µ.
(ǫ) Since I is a model of Oϕ, then there is an element δ ∈ ∆
I such that aI = δ. Since
I is a model of Aϕ, setting g(ǫ) = δ, we have that V
Iϕ(ǫ) = 0 = V I(g(ǫ)) and
the same holds for concept W . Moreover, since I is a model of Tϕ, we have that
V I(δ) = (V1⊔V2)
I(δ) and, therefore V
Iϕ
1 (ǫ) = 0 = V
I
1 (g(ǫ)) and the same holds
for V2, W1 and W2. On the other hand, we have that A
Iϕ(ǫ) = 0.01 = AI(g(ǫ)),
as well. So, g(ǫ) = δ satisfies the condition of the lemma.
(µi) Let now µ be such that g(µ) has already been defined. Now, since I is a
witnessed model and satisfies axiom ⊤ ⊑ ∃Ri.⊤, then for all i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
there exists a γ ∈ ∆I such that RIi (g(µ), γ) = 1. So, setting g(µi) = γ we get
1 = R
Iϕ
i (µ, µi) = R
I
i (g(µ), g(µi)). Furthermore, by inductive hypothesis, we
can assume that V I(g(µ)) = 0.vµ and W
I(g(µ)) = 0.wµ.
Since I satisfies axiom V ⊑ (s + 1)|vi| · ∀Ri.V1, then 0.vµ = V
I(g(µ)) ≤ (s +
1)|vi| · (∀Ri.V1)
I(g(µ)) = (s+1)|vi| · infγ∈∆I{R
I
i (g(µ), γ) ⇒ V
I
1 (γ)} ≤ (s+1)
|vi| ·
RIi (g(µ), µi)⇒ V
I
1 (µi) = (s+ 1)
|vi| · V I1 (g(µi)).
2However, Iϕ is not a strongly witnessed model of Oϕ.
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Since I satisfies axiom (s + 1)|vi| · ∃Ri.V1 ⊑ V , then 0.vµ = V
I(g(µ)) ≥ (s +
1)|vi| · (∃Ri.V1)
I(g(µ)) = (s+1)|vi| · supγ∈∆I{R
I
i (g(µ), γ)⊗V
I
1 (γ)} ≥ (s+1)
|vi| ·
RIi (g(µ), µi)⊗V
I
1 (µi) = (s+1)
|vi| ·V I1 (g(µi)). Therefore, (s+1)
|vi| ·V I1 (g(µi)) =
0.vµ and V
I
1 (g(µi)) = 0.vµ · (s+ 1)
−|vi| = V
Iϕ
1 (µi).
Similarly, it can be shown that W I1 (g(µi)) = 0.wµ · (s+ 1)
−|wi| = W
Iϕ
1 (µi).
Since I satisfies axioms 〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.V2, 0.vi〉 and 〈⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.¬V2, 1− 0.vi〉, it fol-
lows that (∀Ri.V2)
I(g(µ)) ≥ 0.vi and (∀Ri.¬V2)
I(g(µ)) ≥ 1 − 0.vi. Therefore,
for RIi (g(µ), g(µi)) = 1 we have V
I
2 (g(µi)) = 0.vi = V
Iϕ
2 (µi). Similarly, it can
be shown that W
Iϕ
2 (µi) = 0.wi = W
I
2 (g(µi)).
Now, since I satisfies axiom V ≡ V1 ⊔ V2, then, V
I(g(µi)) = V I1 (g(µi)) +
V I2 (g(µi)) = 0.vµ · (s + 1)
−|vi| + 0.vi = 0.vivµ = V
Iϕ(µi).
Finally, by inductive hypothesis, assume that AI(g(µ)) = AIϕ(µ) = 0.01 · (s +
1)
−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}
max{|vj |,|wj|}, where µ = i1i2 . . . ik.
Since I satisfies axioms A ⊑ (s + 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∀Ri.A, we have that
AI(g(µ)) ≤ (s+1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · (∀Ri.A)
I(g(µ)) ≤ (s+1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi)) .
Likewise, since I satisfies axioms (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · ∃Ri.A ⊑ A, we have that
AI(g(µ)) ≥ (s+1)max{|vi|,|wi|} · (∃Ri.A)
I(g(µ)) ≥ (s+1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi))
and, thus,
AI(g(µ)) = (s+ 1)max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µi)) .
Therefore,
AI(g(µi)) = (s + 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AI(g(µ))
= (s + 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} ·AIϕ(µ)
= (s + 1)−max{|vi|,|wi|} · 0.01 · (s+ 1)
−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}
max{|vj |,|wj|}
= 0.01 · (s+ 1)
−(max{|vi|,|wi|}+
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik}
max{|vj |,|wj|})
= 0.01 · (s+ 1)
−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik,i}
max{|vj |,|wj|}
= AIϕ(µi) ,
which completes the proof.
From the last Lemma it follows that if the RPCP instance ϕ has a solution µ, for some
µ ∈ {1, . . . , p}+, then vµ = wµ and, thus, 0.vµ = 0.wµ. Therefore, every witnessed model I
of Oϕ contains an element δ = g(µ) such that V
I(δ) = V Iφ(µ) = 0.vµ = 0.wµ = W
Iφ(µ) =
W I(δ). Conversely, from the definition of Iϕ, if ϕ has no solution, then there is no µ such
that 0.vµ = 0.wµ, i.e., there is no µ such that V
Iφ(µ) = W Iφ(µ).
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However, as Oϕ is always satisfiable, it does not yet help us to decide the RPCP. We
next extend Oϕ to O
′
ϕ in such a way that an instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff
the ontology O′ϕ is not witnessed satisfiable and, thus, establish that the KB satisfiability
problem is undecidable. To this end, consider
O′ϕ := 〈T
′
ϕ,A〉 ,
where
T ′ϕ := Tϕ ∪
⋃
1≤i≤p
{⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.(¬(V ↔W ) ⊔ ¬A)} .
The intuition here is the following. If there is a solution for RPCP then, by the
observation before, there is a point δ in which the value of V and W coincide under I.
That is, the value of ¬(V ↔ W ) is 0 and, thus, the one of ¬(V ↔ W ) ⊔ ¬A) is less than
1. So, I cannot satisfy the new GCI in T ′ϕ and, thus, O
′
ϕ is not satisfiable. On the other
hand, if there is no solution to the RPCP then in Iϕ there is no point in which V and W
coincide and, thus, ¬(V ↔ W ) > 0. However, we will show that the value of ¬(V ↔ W )
in all points is strictly greater than A and, as A⊔¬A is 1, so also ¬(V ↔W )⊔¬A will be
1 in any point. Hence, Iφ is a model of the aditional axiom in T
′
ϕ, i.e., O
′
ϕ is satisfiable.
Theorem 6. The instance ϕ of the RPCP has a solution iff the ontology O′ϕ is not wit-
nessed satisfiable.
(Proof) Assume first that ϕ has a solution µ = i1 . . . ik and let I be a witnessed model
of Oϕ. Let µ¯ = i1i2 . . . ik−1 (last index ik is dropped from µ). Then by Lemma
5 it follows that there are nodes δ, δ′ ∈ ∆I such that δ = g(µ), δ′ = g(µ¯), with
V I(δ) = V Iϕ(µ) = W Iϕ(µ) = W I(δ) and RIik(δ
′, δ) = 1. Then (V ↔ W )I(δ) = 1.
Since (¬A)I(δ) < 1, then (¬(V ↔W )⊔¬A)I(δ) < 1. Hence there is i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
such that (∀Ri.(¬(V ↔W ) ⊔ ¬A))
I(δ′) < 1. So, axiom ⊤ ⊑ ∀Ri.(¬(V ↔ W ) ⊔ ¬A)
is not satisfied and, therefore, Oϕ is not satisfiable.
For the converse, assume that ϕ has no solution. On the one hand we know that
Iϕ is a model of Oϕ. On the other hand, since ϕ has no solution, then there is no
µ = i1 . . . ik such that vµ = wµ (i.e., 0.vµ = 0.wµ) and, therefore, there is no µ ∈ ∆
Iϕ
such that V Iϕ(µ) = W Iϕ(µ). Consider µ ∈ ∆Iϕ and i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p and assume,
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without loss of generality, that V Iϕ(µi) < W Iϕ(µi). Then
(V ↔W )Iϕ(µi) = (V Iϕ(µi)⇒W Iϕ(µi)) ⊗ (W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi))
= 1⊗ (W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi))
= W Iϕ(µi)⇒ V Iϕ(µi)
= 1−W Iϕ(µi) + V Iϕ(µi)
= 1− (W Iϕ(µi)− V Iϕ(µi))
= 1− (0.wµi − 0.vµi)
≤ 1− 0.01 · (s+ 1)−max{|vµi|,|wµi|}
≤ 1− 0.01 · (s+ 1)
−
∑
j∈{i1,i2,...,ik,i}
max{|vj |,|wj|}
= (¬A)Iϕ(µi) .
Therefore, (¬(V ↔ W ))Iϕ(µi) ≥ AIϕ(µi). As AIϕ(µi) ⊕ (¬A)Iϕ(µi) = 1, it follows
that for every µ ∈ ∆Iϕ and i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, it holds that (∀Ri.(¬(V ↔ W ) ⊔
¬A))Iϕ(µ) = 1 and, therefore, Iϕ is a witnessed model of O
′
ϕ.
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